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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants agree with the amplification of the
3tatement of Facts contained in Respondents' Brief
11

(hereafter

Res?. Br.").

ARGUMENT

POic!T I.

THE CITY HAD NO AUTHORITY TO GRANT THE VARIANCE.
In the Brief of Appellants

(hereafter "App. Br."),

Apoellants demonstrated that the City lacked authority to grant
t~e

variance in question on the basis of at least three

t~~ependent grounds:

a)

the variance violated the spirit of the

-

1 -

zoning ordinance; bl
circumstances; and cl

the pro?erty lacks any special
Richardson suffers from no unnecessary

hardships and difficulties.
Respondents failed to even address the first and most
important ground for reversal.

Point IA of Appellants' Brief

explained in detail why a reduction in lot size such as the one
Richardson obtained from Smithfield violates the spirit of the
Smithfield City Ordinance. That proposition was supported by
ample statutory authority and interpretive case law from Utah and
other Jurisdictions.

Respondents did not

(nor could they)

deny

that the basic harmony with the spirit of the zoning ordinance is
an essential aspect of any variance.

Respondents did not deny

that this variance in fact violated the spirit of the Smithfield
City Zoning Ordinance. Their failure to deal with the issues
raised in Point IA of Appellants' Brief should be taken as a
concession that the argument and supporting authority contained
therein are accurate.
Appellants'

second major substantive point was that the

Richardson property had no legally cognizable special
circumstances attached to it:

(App. Br. 111. Respondents again

failed to even address this point in their brief, and that
failure should be taken as an admission that the variance fails
to cieet the requirements of Section 10-9-12 ( 3 I (bl, Utah Code
Anr.otated.
The great bulk cf Respondents'

-

2 -

Brie~

en the

substanti~e

Br1ance issues addresses ";:iractical difficulties" vs.
"unnecessary
~nj

~ardships"

standards of review.

-01~t

tests, the self-imposed hardship doctrine
All of these arguments miss the basic

of Appellants' Brief, which is the failure of this variance

:o comply with Utah Statutory standards, the most vital and basic
cf which is observance of the spirit of zoning ordinances.
The "practical difficulties" and/or "unnecessary
1ardship" portion of the statutory test for variance

~

addressed by Respondents, but their arguments are misplaced in
light of Utah Code Section 10-9-12 (3) (a), and in any case, they
have failed to

show~

legally significant "hardship" or

"difficulty" suffered by Richardson.
Respondents devote great attention in their brief to
distinguishing between the "practical difficulties" standard and
the "unnecessary hardship" test, and they urge upon the Court the
adoption of the less stringent "practical difficulties" test,
especially in cases such as the present one where they claim an
"area" variance is used.

T'.1eir argument fails because the Utah

Statute establishes the test to be employed as "difficulties and
'\ardships."
added).

Section 10-9-12(3) (a), Utah Code Annotated

(emphasis

Respondents admit that the "practical difficulties"

standard they urge is to be found "in many state statutes"
~r.

10). This Court should adhere to and a;:iply the clear language

)f the applicable
~a?e

(Resp.

Utah Statute and reject Respondents' attempt to

the Court ado;:it a foreign statutory standard.

-

3 -

l\nother reason Respondents'

rejected is that the more
would never be applied.

deman~1ng

:iro::iosed test shoulc' he

''unnecessary

hardshi~

11

tesl

T;-,ey argue that "it is only logical to

assume a less stringent standard for an area variance."

They

cite to a Delaware case construing a statute which makes an
express distinction between use and area variances
121. However, under Walton v.
92 P.2d 724

(Resp. Br.

Tracv Loan & Trust Co.,

97 U.249,

(1939), use variances were determined to be violative

of the spirit of the zoning ordinances.

If use variances are per

se invalid in Utah, then the other standards to be applied to

variances, '..rn-:=::.·:~.c

11

;.ractical difficulties" or "unnecessary

hardships", could only be applied to area variances.
Having urged the court to adopt a "practical
difficulties" standard, Respondents then failed to show where
Richardson suffered any "practical difficulties."

As Respondents

themselves point out "whether or not the Utah Courts accept
(Respondents' proposition regarding standards]
for disposition of this case.

is not necessary

(Resp. Br. 121. Appellants

have not yet been told ·o1hat Mr. Richardson's "practical
difficulties" or "unnecessary hardships" were.
Respondents argue that the "self-created hardship"
doctrine does not appl~ since Richardson himself did not "creat~"
the hardship.

Although it is true ttat ?ichardson purchased t~e

lot in a substandard candi~1on,

the record ~akes it clear t~at

che preceding owner divided the one acre lot,

-

4 -

and that ?ichardson

:~1sed

it fully aware that it was restricted (See App. Br.,

·_,-1e:--1t of Facts). Although Richardson purchased the larger
su:clot of the original acre, the remaining one-third acre had a
already constructed on it (See App. Br. Statement of Facts

~ome

<Ji. The effect of the variance, therefore, was not only to allow
3

to be built on a two-third acre lot

~ome

(Richardson's) but

also to allow a home on a one-third acre lot (the prior home)

As is well pointed out in Respondents' Brief, the strict
39pl1cation of the self-created hardship doctrine could work an
inJustice in many cases.

The better rule is to apply the

self-created hardship doctrine on a case by case basis and
consider a purchase with knowledge of restrictions as a "highly
significant fact which .
seeking a variance."
~·

Colo.,

. weighs heavily against the owner

Levy v.

369 P.2d 991

Board of Adjustment of Arapahoe

(1962). Mr. Richardson should not be

allowed to blind himself to valid zoning regulations and ignore
t~e

consequences of buying and obviously restricted lot.

~ornT

I I.

THE SMITHFIELD CITY VARIANCE PROCEDURE IS
ILLEGAL.
Appellants'

principal procedural contention is that the

s1stem employed in Smithfield City incorrectly endows the City
:1unc1l with the ultimate decision making power with regard to
riccance requests
~~1t:c~i2ld

(Ap!J. 3r. 16-19). ResponC:ents claim that th·e

City system merely provides "extra" procedural

-

5 -

protections for Appellants and others similarly si~u3ted.
Again, by contending that the City Council has
po~ers,

'J3ri:ic,,

Respondents ignore Utah Statutes. Section 10-9-12,

Code Annotated states that "t:-,e boar:: cf adjustrc,ent s'."lal 1
the following powers:",
.variance.

appeal.

C•a
';a·~·e

including power to "authorize upon
." If, as Respondents claim,

the City

council can assume the position of the board and grant variances,
a board of adjustments could be rendered useless.

The

legislature intended that the board have a function in zoning
administration and review and so required that all cities wisn1nc
to exercise zoning powers create a board of adjustments.

10-9-6,

Section

2cde Annotated.

Uta~

As anticipated, aespondents continue to rely on
_T_h_u_r_s_t_o_n_v_.__C_a_c_h_e_C~o.;_u_n~t...._·1, 626 P.2d 440

1981) as their

(Utah,

sole authority supporting their proposition that the Smithfieid
City variance procedures are legally acceptable.

They claLrn t'.12:

because the Thurston case involved "procedural" questions,
principles of la·" expounded therein are "d:!.rectly on point"

the
(Si?~

Resp. Br. 5). However, the enabling statute was cif:'erent in t:ia:
case

(county as opposed to city), and the entire procecure '.1as

different

(conditional use permit as opposed to variance).

Thurston simply did not reach th? question of a variance.
The distinction between the Thurston case and the

?resent

~ne

is

are compared.

~ost

In

clear

~he

~~~en

t~e

=espec~ive

case,

T~urston

-

6 -

t~e

statutes

coGnt·;
----"

i~·;~!~-

com~lssion

~a~

crr~t~o:1ary

~'"'
~tcit

power to delegate "special exceptions" jurisdiction

board of adjustments.

Thurston, 626 P. 2d at 445, 446. The

n ° referred to in Thurston was Section 17-27-15, Utah Code

;nnotated, which reads in pertinent part as follows"

"The board of county commissioners shall provide and
specify.
.general rules to govern the
.jurisdiction
of said board of adjustment."
(ecipnasis added).

There is not such provision in

Title 10, Chapter 9 dealing with

£&

board of adjustments.

"Any zoning resolution of the board of county commissioners
.make
provide that the board of adjustment ~·
special exceptions to the terms of the zoning regulations.

~

"

Sectio:-i 17-27-15, Utah Code Annotated
dded).

(emphasis

:\gain, there is no such provision with regard to

~boards

of adjustment.

The statutes in question in this

case, as opposed to those involved in the Thurston case,
leave the Citv Commission with no discretion over the
board's clearly defined variance powers.

"[~]he legislative body shall provide for the appointment of
a board of adjustment."

~~ct1on

1 J-9-6,

Utah Code Annotated

- 7 -

(em9hasis added).

Section 10-9-3, Utah Code Annotaced.

"The board of adjustment shall have the following powers: .
• • (3) To authorize upon appeal.
.variance from the t·-crms
of the ordinance."
Section 10-9-12, Utah Code Annotated

(a~phasis

added).

Nowhere in the City enabling act can there be found any
implication that the Commission has power to retain jurisdiction
over variances.

The ultimate variance decision-making power

rests with the board of

adjust~ent,

and that proposition is as

"clear" from the statutory language," as was the proposition in
Thurston "that

Countv Commission need not interest the Board

th~

of Adjustments within the power to issue special exceptions.
" Thurston, 626 P.2d at 446.

POINT I II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
JUDGMENT TO RESPONDENTS.
In Points IIA and II3 of Respondents'

SU~MARY

Brief,

Respondents attempt to delineate what they feel are the standards
of review to be employed by this Court in reviewing the Board of
Adjustment's and District Court's decisions.

The inconsistencies

in Respondents' ar'Jllments point to the difficulty counsel for
both parties have had in arriving at an ap?ropriate standard of

review ?iven the

0

19rlay of a su~~ar~· judgment o~ to~ of 3 re'11e~

1

of a quasi-judicial administrative tody.

-

3

Pgspondents complain on the one hand that "the facts
not
,tlc1

J:~er

dispute," and that it is Appellants' burden "to bring

~n

such evidence to the Trial Court"
hand,

(Resp. Br. 14). On the

they urge upon the Court the Oklahoma method for

reviewing such cases, which specifies that "appeals from the
~ecisions

of the board of adjustment are to the District Court,

me: the cause is tried de nova"

(Resp. Br. 16).

The proper standard of review can be determined only by
examining the alternatives.

First, if the District Court is to

review the board's decision on a de nova basis as per Whitcomb
·1,

City of Woodward,

J~strict

616 P.2d 455

(Okl. App., 1980), then the

Court would hear the evidence for and against the

?ariance and determine therefrom whether the board of adjustments
~as

within its discretion in granting or denying the variance.

The de novo approach obviates the necessity of the board
~a1ntaining

a detailed record of the evidence because such a

record is developed at the trial court level.

The "presumption

cf regularity" which the board of adjustment's decisions enjoy
~ould

be maintained since the District Court would affirm if some

substantial evidence supported the board's decision.

This Court

:ould then review the record in the District Court and determine
'·~e:::her

')f tne

the District Court's cone 1 us ions are appropriate in 1 igh t
~vidence

adduced.

An alternative method of review is to have the District
~~rt

r2view the ooard's decision without taking any evidence.

-

9 -

Using this methodology,

whether the

~oard

~as

the District Court would determine

~1th1n

discretion

~ts

the proceedings before the board.
Court would

loo~

~sr~ly

In this case,

by

r~v1e~:i~~

the Supreme

to the evidence adduced at the hoard of

adjustments level to

No matter

de~ 0 rm~ne
\~hie~

conditions must be met.

if the

r~·;~~~

First,

is supported.

~ec1sion

methodology is employed,

three

there must be a record of

evidence adduced upon wh1on tne reviewing Court can determine if
the board abused its discretion.
(Richardson)

Second,

must bear the burden of producing evidence to

support the granting of the variance.
must indulge
decision.

the applicant

t~e

Third,

the reviewing court

ooard w1tn a ?resumption of correctness in its

If an; one of these conditions are not met, this Court

has nothing to review or no standard by which to review it.
Respondents claim t'.lat "there is no direct challenge
that this case was not a proper one for summary judgment."
(Resp. 3r. 14). The case is rio:ie for sul'lmary judgment but in
favor of Appellants. This is so because not only are there no
contested facts,

but there are absolutely no facts,

otherwise, on the record which support t'.le variance,

contested or
the boarj's

decision or the trial court's summary Judgment.
infer that it is Appellants' burden to produce evidence for the
trial court or the board.

~here

Respondents have failed to

produce evidence sup9orc1ng t~e variance,

t~e

only jcrden =3rrie~

by Aprellants is to point out t~~s aose~c9 o~ e'J~~ence.

- lG -

In Topanga Ass'n for a
.cs .i\n·.:ieles,
,,:rt

522 P.2d 12

~cenic

Community v.

County of

(Cal., 1974), the California Supreme

concluded:

"that variance boards.
.must render findings to support
their ultimate rulings.
We also conclude that when called
upon to scrutinize a grant of a variance, a reviewing court
must determine whether substantial evidence supports the
findings of the administrative board, and whether the
findings support the board's action."
Tooanga, 522 P.2d at 14, 15.
t~e

The reasoning of

Court was that the findings and evidence must be on the record.
"both to enable the parties to determine whether and on what
basis they should seek review, and, in the event of review,
to apprise a reviewing Court of the basis for the board's
action.
11

To?anga, 522 P.2d at 16.

The reviewing Court

should still "resolve doubts" in favor of the administrative
findings and decision, but in doing so "must scrutinize the
record."

Tooanga 522 P.2d at 16.
In the present case, there is no record to scrutinize,

:~ere

is merely a "findings" sheet which is a checklist of

s~atutory

standards to which the board (or commission) must pay

lip service.
~inutes

What little factual data which are gleaned from the

do not support the determination of the board.
The trial Court erred in granting summary judgment.

If

• reviewed the board's decision on the basis of the evidence
3dduced before the board, it erred because there was no evidence

-

11 -

to supoort the board's finjinys.
deter~ine

wheti1er there w2s

dec.::_3ion,

it erred because there \1a.s co

an~'

evidence to

s1.1~po~t

board's findings at tne trial court 1°vel.
evidence was to be taken,

it was

Ric~ardson

produce the evidence and not Appellants'
Respondents'

to

~v1denc~
~lo
1

s

the

~oarcl'~

t:--.·:

su0~-ort

~atter

;;here the

res?onsibil1ty to

as is implied in

Brief.

CONCLUSION
Smithfield City granted a variance to Richardson.
variance violated the spirit of the ordinance.
no special circumstances.

Section 10-9-12, Utah Code Annotated,
Furthermore,

have granted the variance.
the variance.

The property had

Richardson did not suffer from any

difficulties or hardships absent the variance.

grant the variance.

The

Sy operatio!1

o~

the City was powerless to

the City Commission should not

The trial Court erred in upholding

Summary judgment was granted where

almost entirely void of facts.
few facts were adduced in the

t~e

recor~

Appellants clearly contested
v~r1ance

hearings.

~as
w~at

This Court

should accordingly reverse the summary judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of DeceTber,

-
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